Economic theory suggests that bond issuers of lower credit quality or higher opacity should be more likely to issue bonds with premium coupons (higher coupon rates relative to yields at issuance). Using a comprehensive data set of municipal bonds issued between 1992 and 2012 by more than 21,000 issuers, we show that this has not been the case until early 2000s. We examine what changed in this market to bring it into greater alignment with economic principles. We argue that Government Accounting Standards Board's Statement 34 that required the use of accrual accounting rules in government financial reports deserves the credit.
Introduction
Theoretical research has shown that the terms of debt contracts can be used to alleviate informational frictions between management and investors. Such arrangements are known to boost firm value (Barnea et al., 1980; Flannery, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1998; Aghion and Bolton, 2008; Leland, 1994; DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007; Chava et al., 2010; Dass and Massa, 2014) . While governments are not subject to valuation pressures, asymmetric information problems between the elected officials, the electorate and investors are no less severe. For example, both theoretical and empirical results in the literature suggest that elected officials will seek to provide current benefits while delaying costs into future election cycles (Battaglini and Coate, 2008; Matsen and Thogersen, 2010; Song et al., 2012; Klomp and de Haan, 2013) . If costs are pushed into the future, rollover risk could incentivize investors to demand higher coupons from such localities in order to reduce the duration of their exposure (He and Xiong, 2012) . Similarly, less creditworthy issuers may have to pay premium coupons as a way to demonstrate their ability to generate cash through regular cash payments (Leland, 1994) .
In this paper, we find that until early 2000s, fiscally-distressed localities did not issue premium bonds as predicted. Figure 2 shows that the share of premium bonds in total dollar issuance has been increasing in general since such municipal bonds received preferential tax treatment under Tax Reform Act of 1993. A large number of small-dollar issuers, however, switched to premium issuance after 2000 as evidenced by the trend break in the share of premium bonds in the total number of bonds issued (Figure 1 ) whereas the dollar issuance shows no such break. What has changed in the late 1990s that might have altered the behavior of small-dollar issuers?
In this paper, we argue that the adoption of better accounting rules is responsible for the altered behavior. On June 30, 1999, Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) issued its Statement 34 establishing new financial reporting requirements for state and local governments. The goal of these changes was to increase transparency in local government finances through the dissemination of comprehensive financial statistics reported using the same, uniform accrual accounting principles by all localities. As we describe in greater detail in the next section, accrual accounting lessens the impact of premium coupons on the government's year-end interest expense numbers. This is not to say that the new accounting rules are a window-dressing tool that artificially reduces spending. Cash-accounting does overstate the cost of borrowing with premium coupons because it does not capture the fact that investors paid more than par in return for higher coupons. By contrast, cash accounting underreports the true cost of discount bonds. Since almost all local governments operate under balanced budget requirements, overstated interest expense makes premium bonds unattractive, especially for distressed localities.
If the more opaque or financially-distressed local governments are more motivated to issue premium bonds but were discouraged from doing so by the cash accounting rules, we would expect them to increase their issuance after GASB 34 took effect. We combine Mergent's comprehensive data set of municipal bond issuance with the Census of Governments to test this hypothesis. We find evidence that after the GASB Statement 34, fiscal distress is positively related to the issuance of premium bonds. However, this finding is driven entirely by revenue bonds. The findings are robust to corrections for selection into issuance and a number of alternate specifications.
The analysis will proceed as follows. Section 2 will review the existing related literature and explain incentives created by the rule change. Section 3 will describe the data sets and definition of the variables. Section 4 will present descriptive statistics and model estimates.
Conclusions can be found in section 5.
Literature
Among all the features of debt contracts, the level of coupons relative to the required yield at issuance has been the least studied. De and Kale (1993) examine the choice between fixed, zero and contingent coupons as a signaling mechanism for credit quality but do not model the choice between discount, par, and premium coupons. Hackbarth, Miao, and Morellec (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) establish that firms with volatile cash flows, and therefore higher likelihood of distress and costly liquidation, should prefer lower coupons to avoid a cash shortfall. Only recently, Amiram et al. (2014) provide evidence that supports this theory. They also show that opaque firms tend to issue bonds with higher coupons consistent with investors' desire to mop up excess free cash flows that may be wasted on negative NPV investments or organizational inefficiencies (Jensen, 1986) . Finally, firms with low credit ratings, which may face higher rollover risk, issue higher coupon bonds because investors prefer to receive a larger share of their cash flows in advance before the rollover risk arises at maturity. This is consistent with the literature on the relationship between credit risk and rollover risk (He and Xiong, 2012) .
Municipal issuers should be subject to the same economic principles that govern couponchoice once we control for the fundamental institutional differences between the municipal and corporate debt markets. Taxation of investors is the most obvious difference. Since 1993, municipal bonds with premium coupons receive preferential tax treatment. While all coupons are exempt from federal income taxes (and state income taxes in the issuer's state with few exceptions), the appreciation of a market discount bond towards par may constitute taxable income (or capital gain) depending on the purchase price and the original issue discount. Premium bonds that depreciate towards par are not subject to any tax.
One can see in the issuance data that the share of premium bonds in total dollar issuance has been rising since 1993 (see Figure 1 ). Yet, taxes do not explain the increasing share of premium bonds in the total number of issuances since 2000 (see Figure 2 ). If anything, the marginal tax rates fell after the Bush tax cuts were enacted. Also, there is no discernable change in the dollar amount of premium bond issuance; thus, the increase in numbers must be driven by small-dollar issuers.
The second fundamental difference is the taxing power of government. General obligation (GO) bonds are backed by the full faith and credit of the issuing government and require annual legislative appropriation for their payouts.
1 By contrast, revenue bonds (REV) have a dedicated revenue stream and are not backed by the full faith and credit of the government.
REVs that are issued to support social goals such as housing finance or business ventures (e.g., industrial revenue bonds, hospital bonds, etc.) can and do default if the revenue stream falls below the required payout. Therefore, the findings of the corporate finance literature on the relationship between low-creditworthiness and premium-coupon issuance should be more applicable to REVs. 2 However, this argument still does not explain why the most-distressed REV issuers were using discount coupons before 2000 and made the switch in that particular year ( Figure 4 ). Also, GO issuers of all degrees of fiscal distress also stopped issuing discount bonds in 2000, which cannot be explained by the creditworthiness argument ( Figure 3 ).
Another major difference between corporate and municipal issuers is their treatment in bankruptcy. Even though governments cannot be liquidated, financial distress at subsovereign level is resolved through Chapter 9 bankruptcy, which may impose haircuts on creditors.
3 Therefore, discount bonds should be preferred when cash flows are volatile as suggested by (DeMarzo and Fishman, 2007) . In a municipal setting, Carroll (2009) has shown that local governments with diverse tax and non-tax revenue sources face lower revenue volatility. Because REVs have a single type of revenue source, they should be more likely to be issued with a discount coupon compared to GO bonds. Figures 1 and 2 confirm this hypothesis but this argument still does not explain the presence of the trend break in 2000.
We should also note that there has been no change in the institutional characteristics of the municipal bond markets that would affect the liquidation or agency costs as reviewed above. If anything, transparency improved with the adoption of GASB Statement 34 in 1999, which suggests less-frequent or smaller premium-coupon usage. What is in GASB 34 that would make premium coupons more attractive despite increased transparency?
GASB Statement 34
On June 30, 1999, Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) issued its Statement 34 establishing new financial reporting requirements for state and local governments, including special-purpose governments such as school districts and public utilities. The goal of the Statement was to increase the information available to the public on a government's fiscal health, make it easy to understand, and standardize the reporting to make information comparable across governments. One novelty, for example, was the addition of a management discussion and analysis section to the annual report similar to corporate reports. The Statement's most significant mandate was the requirement to publish new government-wide financial statements prepared using accrual accounting for all government activities rather than cash-based year-end budget reports. The Statement's requirements were phased in over a four year period, with earliest adoptions occurring within a year.
To understand how the accrual accounting increases the attractiveness of premium coupons, let's imagine a locality operating under a debt ceiling as well as a budget constraint. Technically, premium coupons are attractive to localities facing borrowing constraints because cash receipts at issuance will exceed the face value of the debt subject to the limit. Economically, the premium is just another debt that needs to be paid back in higher coupons, but from a cash-budget perspective (or political perspective), it is extra liquidity that can be spent. The disadvantage of premium coupons is that under cash accounting rules, the higher coupon payments will inflate the spending numbers in the future. In order to see how accrual accounting eases these spending pressures, suppose a municipality issues a premium bond that raises $105 on a par value of $100. On the balance sheet, $100 is the debt and the $5 premium is a liability (Deferred Bond Premiums) that is amortized over time. The amortization of a liability is a negative expense. In other words, the amortized liability reduces the impact of the coupon payment on the bottom-line. Many localities do indeed use the premium as a cash reserve to pay off the early coupons and refund the bond when the reserve runs out. 5 By contrast, if a $100 bond is issued at a discount, say $95, the $5 discount goes into an asset account (Deferred Bond Discounts) that also needs to be amortized. However, the amortized asset will add to the coupon payment as an expense, not reduce it. Amortization of the premiums in the post-GASB 34 world could be the accounting trick that tips the balance in favor of premium bonds. If our hypothesis is correct, we would expect the most cash-strapped issuers to increase their use of premium bonds after the adoption of the new rules.
Data and Variable Definitions
The data used in the analysis originates in the Mergent Municipal Bond Securities Database and the Census of Governments (COG 96,812 matches. These matches are primarily departments of the independent governments that can be matched using the jurisdiction name. For example, the Cleveland Metroparks is an independent, regional special district, and its bonds would be linked to its record in the COG in the first matching step. Bonds issued by the Cleveland Department of Parks would be linked to the City of Cleveland in the second step.
For the analysis, the individual governments are the unit of observation, so the merged data sets are collapsed to government-year values. We calculate a dollar value of the premium or discount for every bond that is sold at a value other than face value. These figures are summed within a year to arrive at a net premium or discount. The net value is then divided by the annual expenditures from the Census for scaling. If the issuer issued in a year, but used only par value bonds, the value of this measure is equal to zero. If an issuer did not issue within the year, the observation is a censored observation.
Denoting the year of issuance with t, the year of the preceding Census by T − 1 and the following Census by T , the estimated model is of the form Revenue per capita cannot be calculated for special districts because the population they are serving is not well defined. A port authority, for example, may have no residents but serve thousands of travelers daily. For school districts, the population figure is the number of students because open enrollment policies in many states make it difficult to define a total population served. In our analysis, Distress is measured as the change in the health measure multiplied by -1. That is, a negative change in expenditures would appear as a positive change in Distress.
In this analysis, the treatment of interest is an interaction of issuers' fiscal stress with the amended accounting rules. We assume the rule change was an exogenous shock to all issuers, and we proxy for this treatment using a pre-post indicator which switches on in 2000.
We regard the other part of the treatment, fiscal stress, as an exogenous shock caused by an erosion of the tax base. While these treatments are assumed to be exogenous, we still have to address the issue of selection into the sample. Issuers that are financially distressed might desire to issue premium bonds, but be unable to issue anything because they cannot take on further debt service. In the data, the measures of fiscal distress are indeed positively correlated with the probability of issuing any bonds. We do not suggest that governments issue bonds specifically to collect premiums. Rather, when a bond issuance is required to perform the issuer's primary function, it creates an opportunity to collect a premium. If we estimate the relationship between fiscal stress and premium bond issuance without a sample selection correction, it will be biased downward.
To address this sample selection bias, we use a Heckman procedure with the issuer's scale to instrument for issuance in a given year. The assumption is that larger governments are more likely to access the bond market in any year because their funding needs are large enough to justify a bond issuance (instead of a bank loan), independent of their coupon choice. We use the natural logarithm of the number of employees of the government as our instrument. We believe this is a cleaner form of scale than any itemized or aggregate expense category because localities may differ in the types of expenses they incur during the course of business but employment is common to all. 
Results

Descriptive Statistics
Fitted models
The results appear in Table 2 . The coefficients are maximum likelihood estimates derived with a Heckman correction for sample selection. After controlling for the probability of issuance and selection into the sample, fiscal distress has a positive and significant impact (0.0039) in the model of net premiums on revenue bonds as a percent of annual expenditures.
During the pre-GASB 34 period, the coefficient on the measure of fiscal distress has a negative relationship to the net premiums on revenue bonds realized by the issuers. In the post period, a one standard deviation (29.43) difference in the fiscal health measure would correspond to an additional bond premium of 0.12 percent of annual expenditures.
The contrast between the issuance behavior of fiscally health and potentially distressed local governments could be critical to understating the true impact of the rule change. While making higher cash payments could be a valid signal of creditworthiness among indistinguishable issuers, a change in behavior by all market participants is suggested by the intercept for the post-rule change period (0.81). The Post coefficient is almost 7 times larger the a one standard deviation change in the fiscal health measure is predicted to create. If even one quarter of this difference was due to the rule change rather than market conditions, this would represent a momentous shift.
Alternate Specifications
The main model contrasts a pre and post periods, but we may wish to know if the relationship between fiscal distress and premium bond usage also exists in the cross section. Table   3 Finally, we have repeated our analysis after removing all bonds with a 5 percent coupon from the sample. A 5 percent coupon is the municipal market standard and is in higher demand than lower coupon offerings. As bond yields dropped in 2000s, these standard coupons provided increasing premium reserves to issuers. After dropping these standardcoupon bonds, Table 5 shows that our results still hold with similar signs and magnitudes.
Conclusions
In our paper, we find evidence that fiscally distressed revenue bond issuers collect net bond premiums that equal a larger percentage of their annual expenditures after the release of GASB Statement 34.
We explain this behavior by the removal of the distortions caused by cash accounting.
Accrual accounting increases the reported cost of discount bonds by capturing the fact that part of the cost is in the capital appreciation to par. Conversely, the reported cost of premium bonds is reduced by the recognition that investors are paying the issuer more than par.
While our findings are consistent with the economic theories developed in the corporate finance literature, the documented impact of accounting rules on coupon-choice is unique to our study. Table 5 : Models of net bond premiums as a percentage of annual expenditures excluding 5-percent-coupon bonds. All models include state and year fixed effects. The models are estimated using maximum likelihood and a Heckman correction for sample selection. Fiscal distress is measured by the real budget cuts observed between rounds of the Census of Governments. Local governments that issue bonds within a year are selected into the sample. The log of the count of the government's employees is used to predict selection into the sample, and it is excluded from the second stage regression. Standard errors are clustered by issuer. Data are from the Census of Governments and the Mergent Municipal Bond Securities Database. Significance key: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
